Transphobia

While it is clear transphobia exists… it is far from evident what transphobia is. Provisionally, the term can be defined to mean any negative attitudes (hate, contempt, disapproval) directed toward trans people because of their being trans. When taken literally, the word means a kind of fear. But like homophobia (on which the word is modeled), it is used more broadly. And while transphobia suggests an analogy with terms like agoraphobia and therefore implies irrationality (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines homophobia as ‘‘an irrational fear of, aversion to, or discrimination against homosexuality or homosexuals’’; most dictionaries do not define transphobia at all), this implication ought to be rejected. Transphobia occurs in a broader social context that systematically disadvantages trans people and promotes and rewards anti-trans sentiment. It therefore has a kind of rationality to it, grounded in a larger cisgenderist social context (Hopkins 1996).

The question, however, is how much such a definition can tell us about the nature of transphobia. I have defined transphobia as directed toward trans people. In doing this, I have tried to avoid smuggling an actual account of the underlying nature of transphobia into the definition. But much depends upon how the expression trans people is itself defined. If it is defined as ‘‘those who violate gender norms,’’ or as ‘‘those who are problematically positioned with respect to the gender binary,’’ then a very general account of the nature of transphobia is immediately forthcoming—namely, transphobia is a hostile response to perceived violations of gender norms and/or to challenges to the gender binary.

It is not wise, however, to build a robust account of transphobia into the definition. A trans woman may not view herself as violating norms of gender, and she may not view herself as beyond the binary. Rather, she may see herself as a woman living within the binary and in accordance with norms of womanhood. A robust definition of this type ironically invalidates her gender identity in order to function as an account of transphobia. That is, it perversely enacts a verbal hostility that it fails to explain. I therefore prefer to leave trans people undefined and open to the multiple, contested meanings. Consequently, while transphobia is provisionally defined, one of the central components of that definition (trans people) is not only undefined but left open to multiple interpretations.

Underlying the attempt to build a robust account of transphobia within the definition of the term is the problematic assumption that there is a singular phenomenon of which there can be a uniform account. Consider that while the pronoun it can be used to deny the personhood of individuals deemed outside the binary categories, the expression really a man disguised as a woman effectively accuses a trans person of pretense by deeming them within one of the binary categories. Both are instances of verbal harassment, and both can function as ‘‘justifications’’ for physical violence. But that the latter concerns a response to perceived violations of the binary is surely controversial. Both trans woman and transphobe may agree that she belongs in the binary. The question, on the contrary, is where. Whether there is a singular phenomenon here (hostile responses to perceived violations of the binary) is therefore far from clear. (pp. 249-250)

Individual Author(s): Bettcher, Talia Mae

Source Title: “Transphobia”

DOI / ISBN / Link: https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-2400181

Source Type: Journal article

Country: USA

Year: 2014

Tags: Scholarly

Find it at UCLA: https://search.library.ucla.edu/permalink/01UCS_LAL/192ecse/cdi_unpaywall_primary_10_1215_23289252_2400181